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he Unitarian belief in the changeability and equality of men, emphasis on the importance of social surroundings in the formation of character, and work for political reform were in strong alignment with many demands of the Utilitarians, a philosophical group that demanded social reform based on the principle of utility. Nonetheless Unitarians in general fought shy of following the Utilitarian logic to its extremes. Nevertheless, both groups had become aware of their many similarities already by the 1820s. In the light of Jeremy Bentham’s statement that he derived his principle of social utility from John Priestley, the precise nature of the connection between Unitarian and Utilitarian presents itself like a “hen or egg”-question. Undoubtedly, though, both their tenets are rooted in the Scottish enlightenment, most notably the moral sense philosophy. Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), one of its most influential representatives of the school, held that man has a natural propensity to act out of benevolence. In an etymological reading of this term, Hutcheson defines benevolence as the desire for the happiness of others. The wider the scope of our benevolence, the better – Hutcheson is in fact the first to speak of “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Broadie).

The idea that it is man’s duty and pleasure alike to increase the happiness of his fellow-beings features also in Harriet Martineau’s paper “On the Duty of Studying Political Economy” (1832), which is a particularly noteworthy example of the close links between Unitarianism and Utilitarianism. Following the Unitarian ideals of self-improvement and social commitment, it demands that “every honest man who writes himself a member of society must understand political economy” (27). Martineau considers political economy a science which involves “the laws of social duty and social happiness” (26). It hence “modifies, or ought to modify, our moral philosophy more extensively than any other influence whatsoever” (27). If it did, people would cease to give alms and organize the economy on scientific principles instead. Martineau asks for a “truly effectual benevolence” (29) that rectifies principles rather than ameliorating consequences:

Hundreds, every winter, give money, and time, and pains to supply the poor of our towns with bread and soup. […] If half the pains had been taken to procure a repeal of the corn-laws, directly, by urging the measure on government, and indirectly, by enlightening the public mind on the policy of such a proceeding, the poor of Great Britain might, by this time, have been well fed without having lost their spirit of independence, and would moreover have the prospect of being well fed as long as they could work (ibid., 28).

The social duty that Martineau mentioned earlier is discharged best in discerning and acting upon the laws of supply and demand because only these will end poverty and increase social happiness. This is why the study of political economy is both useful and beautiful: “We will only ask if there is no beauty in those discoveries by which the resources of nature are laid open, or in those processes by which her workings are overruled, to the benefit of man?” (31).

Martineau’s demand to align moral philosophy with scientific guidelines rather than what she considers antiquated authorities and harmful beliefs is in spirit with Bentham’s utilitarian approach. Inspired by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), Bentham developed a moral principle that he thought suits human nature best: The pursuit of happiness and the want for rational explanation. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously remarked: “Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger” (127). In other words, people do not act by following their reason but by following their passions and inclinations. Bentham, who concluded from Hume’s argument, that lust and pain are human constants —  and hence the only reliable and permissible criteria by which to define happiness. As he explains on the very first page of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne” (1).

Hence, actions are morally good if they increase happiness and/or reduce pain, and morally bad if they diminish happiness or inflict suffering. For this reason Martineau objected to alms giving: It addresses symptoms instead of causes and hence does nothing to improve the situation of the poor – it merely degrades them. In focussing on the consequences of a given action rather than its motivation — Martineau concedes that philanthropists surely mean well — Utilitarianism challenges traditional beliefs, which it wants replaced by a society based on rational principles, principles that ought to be followed with an eye on the specific circumstances of a given situation. Martineau for instance emphasizes

that the application of moral principles varies with the social condition of man. […] Modes of action which are good in one age or position of circumstances, are bad in another, while the principle remains the same. If we attempt to frame moral systems, we must make them for the present use only. We must provide for their being modified as the condition of society changes, or we shall do more harm than good. [29]

Bentham saw his Utilitarian approach as a pragmatic guide without any binding general principles. He offers merely guidelines a person to keep in mind when deciding on whether or not to carry out an action: duration and force, probability, possible side effects, and the number of persons concerned. Despite its individualistic nature, Utilitarianism does not offer a blueprint for unchecked egoism. Bentham emphasizes that overall utility should always be taken into account when deciding on an action or principle. This emphasis implies a subtle critique of the English nobility, whose immense wealth fails to contribute to overall welfare of th enation

Related Material

Bibliography

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

Broadie, Alexander, "Scottish Philosophy in the 18th Century." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2017 Edition. Web. September 15, 2020.

Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. London: Dent, 1962.

Martineau, Harriet. “On The Duty of Studying Political Economy.” The Monthly Repository 1 (1832): 24-34. Web. September 10, 2020.


Last modified 24 September 2020