The end of a philosophical epoch comes with the exhaustion of its motive concepts. When all answerable questions that can be formulated in its terms have been exploited, we are left with only those problems that are sometimes called “metaphysical” in a slurring sense—insoluble problems whose very statement harbors a paradox, the peculiarity of such pseudo-questions is that they are capable of two or more equally good answers, which defeat each other. An answer once propounded wins a certain number of adherents who subscribe to it despite the fact that other people have shown conclusively how wrong or inadequate it is; since its rival solutions suffer from the same defect, a choice among them really rests on temperamental grounds. They are not intellectual discoveries, like good answers to appropriate questions, but doctrines. At this point philosophy becomes academic; its watchword henceforth is Refutation, its life is argument rather than private thinking, fair-mindedness is deemed more important than single-mindedness, and the whole center of gravity shifts from actual philosophical issues to peripheral subjects—methodology, mental progress, the philosopher’s place in society, and apologetics.
The eclectic period in Greco-Roman philosophy was just such a tag-end of an inspired epoch. People took sides on old & questions instead of carrying suggested ideas on to their further implications. They sought a reasoned belief, not new things to think about. Doctrines seemed to lie around all ready-made, waiting to be adopted or rejected, or perhaps dissected and recombined in novel aggregates. The consolations of philosophy were more in the spirit of that time than the disturbing whispers of a Socratic daemon. [20]
Related material
Bibliography
Langer, Suzanne K. Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art (1941). New York: Mentor/American Library, 1951.
Last modified 14 July 2019